


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

U.S. GRANT'S HUNT FOR THE MOOSE:  
An Analysis of the Vicksburg Campaign  
Utilizing the  
"Principles of War"

by  
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department.


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## ABSTRACT

Welby Hand is a journalist for the New York Sun sent to interview General Ulysses S. Grant following the surrender of Vicksburg on 4 July 1863. In the interview, Grant expounds on the campaign, from the time he took personal command in the field in January 1863, until the fall of Port Hudson on 9 July 1863. Grant describes his strategy and how he implemented it, utilizing the Principles of War as his basis for campaign planning and execution. Each principle is discussed and examples are provided to demonstrate their use. It is emphasized throughout the interview that the Principles of War are just another tool that either combatant commander may use to enhance his operational planning. Examples are given contrasting opposing commanders use of certain principles and who best utilized that particular principle.

## PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Vicksburg campaign as it relates to the Principles of War. Morris Freeley and Welby Hand are fictional characters used as a conduit to have General Ulysses S. Grant analyze the campaign, utilizing the Principles of War as he may have, had they existed as a tool in his era. This interview never occurred and is used solely as a means to impart the author's view and ideas in an enjoyable and readable manner. Many of the terms and ideas presented in this paper were not in use in 1863 and are used here to assist the reader in analyzing the campaign in today's language. All facts, personnel and quotations are accurate, true and are appropriately documented. It is hoped that the reader of this paper accepts the author's literary license and can understand the gist of this paper without being unduly distracted by the manner in which it is presented.

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# **U.S. GRANT'S HUNT FOR THE MOOSE**

By  
Welby Hand  
New York Sun

As a reporter for the New York Sun, I have been covering this war of rebellion since the rebels first fired on Fort Sumter in April of 1861. I have covered every major engagement from the first battle of Bull Run until the recent "victory" at Gettysburg; in addition, I have had the opportunity to observe every Union commander from Scott to Meade.<sup>1</sup> However, I must clarify one point, I have covered every major engagement fought by the Army of the Potomac, not all Union forces. On this past Fourth of July, I filed my story on the victory at Gettysburg, I was there as the great Robert E. Lee was stopped in his invasion of Pennsylvania and sent back to Virginia. The Army of the Potomac was flush with victory and felt proud and vindicated that they had been able to halt the advance of the Army of Northern Virginia. The day after I filed my story, I received a cable from my editor, Morris Freeley, directing to me to return to New York in preparation for a new assignment. I arrived on the sixth and immediately went to see the boss. After exchanging the obligatory pleasantries, Mr. Freeley got down to the purpose of the meeting. He asked me why I thought the battle at Gettysburg constituted a Union victory. After I presented my reasons, he asked some very hard and direct questions: Did Lee surrender? How many Confederates surrendered? How many stands of weapons and artillery pieces were garnered by the Union forces after this victory? I had to admit, Lee did not surrender, he took his entire army with him back to Virginia, and as far as I knew, all his artillery went back with him too. Not known for his tact, Mr. Freeley let it be known that if the Union kept winning these kinds of victories, they would

be fighting this war until 1900. It was at this point he gave me my new assignment. Two days prior, on the Fourth of July, General Ulysses S. Grant accepted the surrender of General John Pemberton's 30,000 man army at Vicksburg.<sup>2</sup> He let it be known - that was what constituted a victory and Vicksburg wasn't the first time Grant had won. My new assignment, go to Mississippi, interview General Grant and find out what he was doing different that was allowing him to win.

I arrived at Grant's Headquarters on the 19th of July; the day prior, he had announced to General Halleck, the Commander in Chief of the Army, the fall of Jackson, Mississippi and the termination of the Vicksburg campaign.<sup>3</sup> I was fortunate in that the General knew I was arriving and had set aside some time in order to conduct the interview. We wasted no time in getting started and I immediately asked him what he did that was so different that allowed him to win such victories, while his contemporaries seemed incapable of the same success. General Grant went into great detail on what he calls his "Tenets of Combat" or what he describes more accurately as "Principles of War".<sup>4</sup> He stated that there are nine principles that he tries to adhere to and that they play a pivotal role in his planning and execution of campaigns and that this process was absolutely essential in his victory at Vicksburg. In the following interview, General Grant describes each principle and explains what affect each had on the overall campaign, as well as how each affected the tactical, operational and strategic level of the conflict. He describes warfare as an art and these principles are just additional colors he has added to his palette. The following transcript is of my interview with General Ulysses S. Grant conducted on 19 July 1863.



## GRANT INTERVIEW

**HAND:** General, thank you for your time this afternoon, it's a pleasure to meet you and have the opportunity to conduct this interview. My editor, Morris Freeley, is curious as to why our forces are winning such major victories in the West, while the Army of the Potomac seems to be ineffective and incapable of accomplishing a clear victory. You recently captured Vicksburg and its army of 30,000, leading to the fall of Port Hudson five days later and once again making the Mississippi a Union highway. At the same time, the Army of the Potomac halted the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, yet it did not achieve a victory of the same magnitude as yours, in that the Army of Northern Virginia was able to leave the field of battle and is still a potent fighting force. Would you care to make a statement as to what you are doing different and what could be done to achieve the same level of victory in the East?

**GRANT:** I'd be happy to discuss what we accomplished at Vicksburg; however, I don't fully know all the details about what occurred at Gettysburg and feel it would be inappropriate to speculate on the actions of General Meade. Anytime one can defeat General Lee on the field of battle, I would consider that a major victory.

In regards to Vicksburg, you understand we did not achieve victory overnight and that a great deal of planning and a number of smaller tactical victories occurred before we were able to declare a final victory in the campaign. One of the tools I used to evaluate possible courses of action and operations is what I call my "Tenets of Combat"; Bill Sherman says a better term would be "Principles of War".<sup>5</sup> He may be right, in any case, there are nine principles that I try to identify, evaluate and implement. By no means are these principles all inclusive when

conducting combat operations nor are they mutually exclusive; what they are is a tool to help one try to see the big picture. Some principles, such as the objective, are constant and must always be identified; others may be supporting elements, and some may actually denigrate the plan if not used appropriately or if the enemy has employed them better than you.

**HAND:** General, you have spoken of these elements; however, you haven't identified them for me. Could you do that and explain how they helped you in your campaign?

**GRANT:** Yes, I'm sorry, it is just that they have become so ingrained in our everyday planning process, I have a tendency to forget not everyone understands or knows what they are. My nine Principles of War are: Maneuver, Objective, Offensive, Surprise, Economy of Force, Mass, Unity of Command, Simplicity and Security. To make it simple, I've taken the first letter of each word and made my own, MOOSEMUSS, to help me remember them. In fact, in our planning process, my staff calls it "hunting the MOOSE". I'll start first with Maneuver; however, I want to emphasize that the order in which I present these is not necessarily the order of their importance.

MANEUVER is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure positional advantage.<sup>6</sup> During the campaign, I continually maneuvered my forces throughout the area seeking critical vulnerabilities to exploit, attempting to confuse Pemberton as to what I was doing and maneuvering so that I could mass my forces at the critical point, at a time and place of my choosing. From the moment of taking command in person, I became satisfied that Vicksburg could only be turned from the south side.<sup>7</sup> The only problem I had was how to get there. I desired to traverse down the Louisiana side of the Mississippi; however, during the January to March timeframe the water is too high to permit any movement along that route.

Therefore, I attempted a number of experiments, more to occupy the minds and labors of my troops than to achieve any type of success, until the water in the bayous started to recede.<sup>8</sup> Mind you, these were not simply idle measures and had they proven successful, would have been exploited. As you know, none proved fruitful. At the end of March, I directed General McClelland, commander of the XIII Corps, to reconnoiter a route down the western bank. He reported back that he felt a movement down the Louisiana side of the river could be accomplished. Except for McClelland, my other generals, and in particular Sherman, were opposed to that route; Sherman wanted to go back up to Memphis and down the railroad line. Politically, I couldn't do that, it would have looked like a retreat and would have jeopardized the entire operation. I told Sherman that I would take no step backward.<sup>9</sup> I knew this would be the best move, because Pemberton would not expect it due to its perceived unfeasibility.

**HAND:** General, why didn't General Sherman want you to go down the west bank of the river?

**GRANT:** Because it was difficult and untried; however, the primary reason was that once we arrived to the south of Vicksburg, we still had to cross the Mississippi and when we crossed, we would sever our lines of communication.

**HAND:** It sounds like the stakes were pretty high, what made you decide on this particular course of action?

**GRANT:** This is where the other Principles of War can be mutually supporting and in this case, it was the principle of surprise. SURPRISE is striking the enemy at a time, place or manner for which it is unprepared.<sup>10</sup> Another aspect of surprise is deception. I knew that Pemberton wouldn't expect us to maneuver south, and to keep him thinking that, I had to

initiate a deception plan that would keep him completely off balance. As McClelland was working on the western bank route and moving his corps down to Hard Times, General Fred Steele's division launched a three week diversionary raid 100 miles north of Vicksburg in the vicinity of Greenville. Steele confiscated livestock, burned fields and raised enough havoc to make Pemberton think this was the initial attack in the next assault on Vicksburg.

Consequently, he dispatched forces to the north to engage these invaders; however, by the time they arrived, Steele had completed his mission and returned to his base of operations at Milliken's Bend.<sup>11</sup>

The other deception operation I directed was a cavalry raid down the center of Mississippi. Colonel Ben Grierson departed with 1700 cavalymen from LaGrange, Tennessee on 17 April and for 16 days disrupted the Confederate lines of communication, tore up 60 miles of railroad track, destroyed two locomotives, captured 500 prisoners and destroyed numerous rebel supply dumps. But the most important accomplishment was that he tied up a division of Confederate infantry and took away Pemberton's eyes and ears, his cavalry.<sup>12</sup> These two diversions were instrumental in allowing the army to move down the western side of the Mississippi without being detected and cross the river unopposed.

**HAND:** General, I understand how you got south of Vicksburg, but how did you cross the river?

**GRANT:** We would never have been able to cross the river had it not been for Admiral David Porter, Commander of the Mississippi Squadron. Where I had to maneuver my army to the south, he had to do the same with his flotilla, only my job was easier. My movement was unopposed, he had to run the gauntlet of the Vicksburg shore batteries. On 16 April, he made

his run past the Vicksburg batteries with 11 boats, all but one made it past successfully. Six nights later, six steamers made the run through the gauntlet; again, with the loss of only one craft. Miraculously, not a single seaman was lost on either of the runs. The significance of Admiral Porter's success is immeasurable, because had he not succeeded or had he refused to make the run, there would not have been a victory, because I wouldn't have been able to get my army across the river.<sup>13</sup>

This brings me to the principle of unity of command. UNITY OF COMMAND means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.<sup>14</sup> I did not have that at Vicksburg with regards to the Navy; Admiral Porter was not under my command and the most I could do was request his support.<sup>15</sup>

**HAND:** So, Admiral Porter wasn't obligated to support you in your campaign?

**GRANT:** That is correct.

**HAND:** Well, if that was the case, why did he put his flotilla to such risk?

**GRANT:** For two reasons, Admiral Porter is a warrior and has the heart of a lion and even though I didn't have Unity of Command, we shared a unity of effort; we both wanted to see the capitulation of Vicksburg. Admiral Porter and I had a very good working relationship and he let it be known that he would cooperate whenever and wherever I desired.<sup>16</sup>

I realize I have bounced around a bit, but the next principle I'd like to discuss is the most important principle of all, the OBJECTIVE. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective.<sup>17</sup> In war, there are three types of objectives, tactical, operational and the national/strategic objective.

Attainment of tactical objectives builds toward the attainment of operational objectives, which in turn builds toward the attainment of the national objective. Early in the war, the President identified control of the Mississippi as a national objective.<sup>18</sup> He realized that attainment of this goal would cut the Confederacy in two, disrupt its flow of supplies from west to east, provide the Federal army and navy a convenient highway for further operations and would reopen the trade route to the sea for the farmers and merchants in the Northwest. In November of 1861, the President identified Vicksburg as an operational objective when he stated that Vicksburg was the key and that the war could never be brought to a close until that key was in our pocket.<sup>19</sup> The reason Vicksburg was an operational vice tactical objective was because the objective was more than just the occupation of Vicksburg; it included the opening of the Mississippi to navigation, control of the land areas of Western Tennessee and Mississippi, subjugation of a Confederate army and the division of Confederate General Joe Johnston's Department of the West, splitting Pemberton's Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana from Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee. Our tactical objectives, such as crossing the river, the battles of Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill and Big Black River Bridge were just stepping stones to achieving the operational objective.

**HAND:** You mentioned a number of battles, would you go into some detail on those? My readers would like to know how you fought your battles and so far all you've discussed is maneuvering, deception and surprise.

**GRANT:** What you are referring to is the principle of war known as the OFFENSIVE. But let me assure you that we were involved in battle long before the bullets started to fly. Remember, maneuver is positioning your forces to secure a positional advantage and surprise

is striking your enemy at a time and place for which he is unprepared. We accomplished that before we fired the first musket. Our successful, unopposed landing at Bruinsburg is testimony to that fact.<sup>20</sup>

In regards to the offensive, it is important to know that it is the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.<sup>21</sup> Up to this point, we had maintained freedom of action and it was from this point on I was determined to achieve decisive results. For the next 19 days we were on the offensive and employed all nine principles of war on a continual and mutually supporting basis. Surprise and maneuver were the primary principles in play that allowed us to make a successful unopposed landing at Bruinsburg. General Pemberton felt that our movement south was a feint to the actual landing taking place concurrently by Sherman up north at Haynes Bluff. He surmised this because he knew that crossing the river to the south of Vicksburg would cause me to sever my own lines of communication and that would entail too great a risk; therefore, the southern force could not possibly constitute my main effort.<sup>22</sup>

**HAND:** General, why did you sever your own lines of communication?

**GRANT:** I knew from my experience in Mexico, the ability of a force to live off the land and of the resilience of soldiers in adverse conditions.<sup>23</sup> I also knew that living off the land and not relying on lines of supply freed my forces for fighting and didn't tie them up protecting lines of communication. In fact, Pemberton attempted to maneuver against our nonexistent LOC's in the hope I would have to fall back from my offensive in order to protect them. Unfortunately for him, there weren't to any attack.<sup>24</sup> This also helps to demonstrate the principle of ECONOMY OF FORCE, the purpose of which is to allocate minimum essential combat

power to secondary efforts.<sup>25</sup> This is an important point, because I needed every soldier I had up front fighting as I made my way toward Jackson, not in the rear pulling guard duty.

**HAND:** OK, I understand why you cut your LOC's, but why did you go to Jackson instead of straight up to Vicksburg? It would appear that you went out of your way and had to double back to get to Vicksburg.

**GRANT:** Once I crossed to the eastern side of the Mississippi, I knew I couldn't attack from the south. Even though I outnumbered Pemberton by 10,000, he still had internal lines to the Confederacy, those numbers could dramatically increase if I didn't cut those LOC's. That's why I attacked east to Jackson and then took Vicksburg from the east. I knew I had to attack Vicksburg at its decisive point, its rear - the eastern side.<sup>26</sup> I also knew I had to get to Jackson before Johnston could get there with the Army of Tennessee. That is where my speed of maneuver and lack of LOC's played to my advantage; I was able to move fast (maneuver), use my soldiers as fighters not sentries (Economy of Force) and apply the principle of mass when I became engaged in battle.

**HAND:** General Grant, that is the first time you mentioned mass, would you expound on that please?

**GRANT:** Certainly. The purpose of MASS is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the time and place to achieve decisive results.<sup>27</sup> I was able to do this and as a result was successful in the five battles we fought prior to arriving at the outskirts of Vicksburg.

**HAND:** And what battles were those?

**GRANT:** The battle of Port Gibson on 1 May, Raymond on 12 May, Jackson on 14 May, Champion's Hill on 16 May and the Big Black River Bridge on 17 May. It was important that



I was able to employ mass and economy of force during these battles, because during the April to May time frame I never had more than 45,000 men available for my approach to Vicksburg and it is an accepted fact that the advantage normally goes to the defender.

**HAND:** Why is that?

**GRANT:** Because they normally have time on their side, they know the terrain and should have been able to establish prepared positions. A rule of thumb when attacking prepared defensive positions is to have a 3 to 1 advantage in troops prior to attacking. With my ability to maneuver, mass my forces and the fact that the rebels never really knew where we were going, I was usually able to come close to those numbers. It wasn't until the first half of June, during the siege, that I started receiving reinforcements and actually outnumbered the defenders.<sup>28</sup>

**HAND:** General, I believe you discussed all the principles in MOOSEMUSS except the last two, simplicity and security. Is there anything you would like to say about those or did you not utilize those two principles in your campaign?

**GRANT:** On the contrary, they were an integral part of my campaign. Security is continual, if you fail in security, you could lose the element of surprise, your maneuvering ability could disappear due to enemy knowledge of your plans, you could lose the initiative and as a result fail to achieve your objectives. SECURITY enhances your freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence or surprise.<sup>29</sup> One of the things that enhanced our security posture was our speed of maneuver and offensive actions. We never lost the initiative and as a result, the enemy was always reacting to our actions instead of the other way around, and this adversely affected his ability to influence our actions. We also were very

concerned with operational security or OPSEC as we like to say. Our plans were always very closely held and only those with a valid need to know were allowed access to them. Again, part of the mutual support these principles provide came as a result of our deception plan, which falls under the principle of surprise.

**HAND:** That is interesting, I thought security was more cloak and dagger and secret codes.

**GRANT:** What we are attempting to do when we employ OPSEC is to keep our plans away from the enemy's cloak and dagger types. In regards to codes, the ability to send information quickly and securely is important and it did pay innumerable benefits for us during the campaign. Through the use of our signal corps and the innovation of signal lights, we were able to confuse the Confederates as to what we were doing.<sup>30</sup> So there's an example of how we employed security at the operational, as well as the tactical level.

**HAND:** General, everything you've shared with me so far has been extremely enlightening; however, I must admit none of it sounds very simple. How can simplicity possibly play in your operational planning and campaigning.

**GRANT:** Good question! Simplicity is very important in any campaign, one shouldn't do things he isn't capable of or that are so difficult they are impractical. I was guilty of violating my own tenet a couple of times, the worst probably when I had Sherman's troops attempt to dig a canal to divert the Mississippi around Vicksburg in the hopes it would wither and die on the vine. All I accomplished was to keep several thousand men busy digging for three months with no change in the river's course.<sup>31</sup> Of course, as I said before, it was better to keep them occupied than just sitting around waiting for the water level in the bayous to drop.

**HAND:** General, you defeated the rebels at Big Black River Bridge on 17 May, yet Vicksburg didn't surrender until July 4th. After moving so fast after crossing the Mississippi, why did it take another month and a half for Vicksburg to capitulate?

**GRANT:** After the battle at the Big Black, we crossed the river and I massed my three corps before the town's defenses, it was here where I made a major mistake. I suspected that the enemy's morale was shattered and that he would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg.<sup>32</sup> I only outnumbered Pemberton by a ratio of 1.5:1 and as I stated earlier, you should not attack a defensive position with less than a ratio of 3:1. However, I thought the rebel will to fight was gone and that there would only be token resistance. I ordered a general assault on the 19th of May and it was resoundingly defeated. We suffered almost 1000 casualties that day.<sup>33</sup> Even with this set back, the morale and fighting fervor of the troops was such that I thought Vicksburg could be taken and ordered another assault on the 22nd. It was another failed attempt which resulted in 3200 casualties, of which 502 had been killed.<sup>34</sup> It was in this instance that General Pemberton did the better job of applying the principle of mass. I knew that any further assaults would be useless and that it was time to set in for a siege. I didn't have the mass to conduct anymore assaults; however, I had sufficient forces to lay siege to Vicksburg, as well as detaching Sherman's Corps to the east to keep Joe Johnston from attacking my rear.

**HAND:** General, if you could do it over again, would you still have conducted an assault or would you have gone right into the siege?

**GRANT:** I would still order the assaults.

**HAND:** I thought you said you had made a mistake.

**GRANT:** I made a mistake in underestimating the enemy's will to fight. I wanted to take Vicksburg before Johnston could build a relief force and before the summer heat and disease started to take a toll. Also, my boys felt they could take Vicksburg and they wouldn't have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try.<sup>35</sup>

**HAND:** Did you have any special plan for the siege that would speed up the surrender?

**GRANT:** Nothing particularly different, I wanted to close the city to ensure nothing got in or out; I also applied constant pressure by ordering continual bombardments and digging approach trenches ever closer to the city to enhance future operations. Once again Admiral Porter provided invaluable support, bombarding the city from the river as my guns bombarded it from our positions on shore.

**HAND:** Had your troop strength improved any during this time?

**GRANT:** Yes, by the end of May I started receiving reinforcements and by mid June I had over 70,000 troops at Vicksburg. I now felt I had the capability and numbers to mass all of my combat power (naval gunfire, artillery, engineers and infantry) and once again attempt an assault on Vicksburg. This time the principle of mass was in my favor.

**HAND:** Did you conduct the assault?

**GRANT:** No I didn't, I had scheduled it to commence on 6 July, but on the 3rd General Pemberton requested terms.

**HAND:** Did Pemberton know that you had planned an assault?

**GRANT:** I can't say for sure, but it is difficult to completely conceal all your preparations when you are planning an assault as large as this. This was one time I wanted my security to be a bit lax, in order for the enemy to see that they would be fighting a fresh, well fed,

numerically superior army. In answer to your question, I think a combination of the assault he assumed was coming and the deprivation and suffering his men and the inhabitants of the city had suffered throughout the siege were enough for him to decide to put an end to the suffering.<sup>36</sup>

**HAND:** Did you offer them the famous U.S. Grant unconditional surrender?

**GRANT:** Initially, but I eventually paroled them.

**HAND:** Why did you do that, weren't you afraid you'd be fighting them again?

**GRANT:** No, I felt the fight was pretty much out of them. But the main reason was logistics. Their war was over, mine wasn't, I couldn't afford to transport them to Cairo or dispatch the troops that would be required to guard them. Immediately following the surrender, I was already preparing to maneuver against Johnston.

**HAND:** Well General, we all know this past 4th of July was very fortuitous with the surrender and you have earned the respect of a very grateful nation. Before we conclude this interview, is there anything else you would like to say?

**GRANT:** In discussing this campaign, I tried to convey it to you utilizing the principles of war. What I want to point out is that those principles are not a panacea to victory, one's adversaries can use them as easily as you can. What they are is a tool the commander can use to look at all aspects of the campaign during the planning phase. They help him keep his eyes open and attention focused to the task at hand. Regardless of the planning process and the tools used, they are all subordinate to the initiative, audacity and courage of the army itself.

**HAND:** General, it has been a pleasure and I thank you for your time.

# FINAL THOUGHTS

Five days after Grant accepted the surrender of Vicksburg, Major General Franklin Gardner of the Confederacy surrendered Port Hudson to Major General Nathaniel P. Banks of the Union Army; thus, completing the task of opening the Mississippi River from Minnesota to New Orleans.

With the surrender of the Confederates at Vicksburg, Grant achieved for the Union a number of major strategic objectives in the Western Theater of Operations: 1) The destruction of a Confederate army. 2) The cutoff of the Confederacy from its rich supply base west of the Mississippi and the states of Texas, Arkansas and Louisiana. 3) The opening of the Mississippi to navigation with the Northwest. 4) The severing of Confederate communications with foreign countries. 5) The rupture of Confederate lines of supply to Mexico. 6) The demoralization of the Confederate citizenry.<sup>37</sup>

Grant's move on Vicksburg was a perilous one, a move few military men would have dared to undertake, but Grant is of that bold, sanguine nature, ever confident of success.<sup>38</sup> Through his use of the principles maneuver, security and surprise, he marched his army down the Louisiana side of the Mississippi in preparation for an assault on the Confederacy, all the time confusing his enemy as to where he was and what his intentions were. After crossing The Big Muddy, he utilized the principle he identified as the offensive and marched his army 200 miles, fought five battles, captured over 6000 prisoners and 67 pieces of artillery in a period of 18 days.<sup>39</sup> He conducted this offensive, again using the principles of maneuver, security and surprise; however, this time he added mass and economy of force to his repertoire. He proved

that the Army and the Navy can work together for a common cause as long as there is a unity of effort. But let there be no doubt that there was also a Unity of Command. Grant by no means is a simple man; though he formulated complex plans, he presented them in a simple and uncomplicated manner that ensured all who had to implement them understood them; thus, exercising the principle of simplicity. Most important of all, General Ulysses S. Grant was focused! He understood what his objectives were and never swayed from them. In the end, he wanted to destroy his enemy on the field of battle, but he saw the taking of Vicksburg on a larger level. The defeat of Pemberton was secondary to the main objective of opening the Mississippi and denying it to the Confederacy. Vicksburg was a means to an end, not an end itself.<sup>40</sup>

I now understand why Mr. Freeley sent me out west, I also know that the capture of Vicksburg was more decisive than Gettysburg. Its loss was a mortal wound for the Confederacy.<sup>41</sup> This was truly a Union victory - NOT A TIE!

In closing, I want to pass along you my readers, that General Grant got his moose and it's known as Vicksburg. One question remains: Is there a moose hunter in the Army of the Potomac? If not, I know where to find one.

NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Stewart Sifakis, Who Was Who in the Civil War (New York: Facts On File Publications, 1988), 576 & 440.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas E Greiss, ed., The American Civil War (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1987), 119.

<sup>3</sup> Adam Badeau, Military History of U.S. Grant (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1885), 412.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C: 1 February 1995), A-1

<sup>5</sup> Sifakis, 590.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, A-2

<sup>7</sup> Robert Collins Suhr, "Grant's Misadventure in the Bayou." America's Civil War May 1997, 46.

<sup>8</sup> Jerry Korn, War on the Mississippi: Grant's Vicksburg Campaign (Alexandria, Va: Time-Life Books, 1985), 56-83.

<sup>9</sup> Badeau, 182-185.

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, A-2.

<sup>11</sup> Greiss, 83.

<sup>12</sup> Shelby Foote, The Beleagured City, The Vicksburg Campaign (New York: Random House, 1963), 132-145.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 118-125.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, A-2.

<sup>15</sup> Foote, 114.

<sup>16</sup> Richard M. Beckinger, "A Major Naval Operation During the Civil War," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1997

<sup>17</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, A-1



- <sup>18</sup> Phillip M. Thienel, Seven Story Mountain, The Union Campaign at Vicksburg (Jefferson, NC: McFarlands and Company 1995), 4.
- <sup>19</sup> Richard Wheeler, The Siege of Vicksburg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1978), 1-2.
- <sup>20</sup> Thienel, 173-174.
- <sup>21</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, A-1.
- <sup>22</sup> Bruce Catton, Reflections on the Civil War (New York: Doubleday, 1981), 103.
- <sup>23</sup> William J. Hart, "The Education of an Operational Commander: Ulysses S. Grant. 1861-1863," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1996.
- <sup>24</sup> Richard M. Zimmon, "Transportation Technology: Lessons from the Campaign for Vicksburg," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1997.
- <sup>25</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, A-1.
- <sup>26</sup> J.F.C. Fuller, Grant and Lee: a Study in Personality and Leadership (Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, 1957), 181-182.
- <sup>27</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, A-1.
- <sup>28</sup> Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: The Organized War 1863-1864 (New York: Charles Scribner's Son's, 1971) 58.
- <sup>29</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, A-2.
- <sup>30</sup> Leander Stillwell, The Story of the Common Soldier (Kansas City: Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, 1920), 141.
- <sup>31</sup> Catton, 102.
- <sup>32</sup> Korn, 126.
- <sup>33</sup> Henry Steele Commager, ed., The Civil War Almanac (New York: World Almanac Publications, 1983), 148.
- <sup>34</sup> Korn, 132
- <sup>35</sup> James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 633.

<sup>36</sup> Ernst R. Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 888.

<sup>37</sup> Thienel, 236-237.

<sup>38</sup> Lucius W. Barber, Army Memoirs, (Chicago: J.M.W. Jones Stationery and Printing Company, 1894), 109.

<sup>39</sup> A.A. Hoehling, Vicksburg, 47 Days of Siege. ((Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentis-Hall, 1969), 8.

<sup>40</sup> Robert A. Bellitto, "Vicksburg: Prologue to Joint Operations," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1995.


<sup>41</sup> Catton, 100.

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
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FIGURE 1  
THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN  
29 MARCH-18 MAY 1863




Source: Richard Wheeler, The Siege of Vicksburg, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1997).

FIGURE 2  
GRIERSON'S RAID  
APRIL-MAY 1863



Source: Samuel Carter, The Final Fortress: The Campaign for Vicksburg 1862-1863, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).

FIGURE 3  
SIEGE OF VICKSBURG  
19 MAY - 4 JULY 1863



Source: General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as a Military Commander, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970).